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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------
STREVELL PATERSON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Vs. Case No. 17598 
MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant based on Defendant' 
written guarantee of the debts of Mountainland Sports, Inc. 
Plaintiff had previously obtained a Judgment against said 
Corporation which Plaintiff alleges has been unsatisfied. 
Defendant filed a Third-Party Claim against DAVID J. TOUSSANT, 
seeking indemnity from him to the extent he may be found liable: 
Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A hearing was held in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, Q', 
the 9th day of December, 1980, on Plaintiff's Motion for Summar' 
Judgment. After oral arguements the Court granted Plaintiff's 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion and signed an Order to that effect on the 29th day of 
December, 1980. Notice of Appeal was timely filed within the 
extended time period granted the Defendant-Appellant in the Court 
below. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Supreme Court 
vacate the Summary Judgment entered against Defendants in the 
District Court below and remand the case for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about January 19, 1977, Defendants, MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, 
and LLOYD UNGRICHT, signed a guarantee whereby they agreed to 
personally and continually guarantee payment of the purchase price 
of all goods and merchandise sold to Mountainland Sports, Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation") by Plaintiff 
STRAVELL PATERSON. Defendant was then a stockholder and Director 
of the Corporation. This guarantee could be revoked by the 
guarantors upon giving 30-days written notice thereof to STRAVELL 
PATERSON, leaving the guarantors liable only as to past debts of 
the Corporation. 
On or about the first day of April, 1978, Defendant, MICHAEL 
R. FRANCIS, sold all interest he owned in the Corporation to DAVID 
-2-
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J. TOUSSANT, and notified Plaintiff, STRAVELL PATERSON, of the 
sale in writing and further exercised his right to terminate~ 
guarantee. 
On or about the 5th day of April, 1978, Plaintiff by its 
agent, MR. GANETT, acknowledged the above Notice of Defendant, 
MICHAEL R. FRANCIS. Plaintiff, through its agent, KEITH HYATT, 
offered to release Defendant, MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, from all 
liability, including past liability, under his guarantee of the 
debts of the Corporation if Defendant, MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, as 
agent for the Corporation, would sign a Promissory Note and 
Security Agreement obligating the Corporation for a certain 
amount. Defendant, MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, did in fact execute a 
Promissory Note and Security Agreement as agent for said 
Corporation in exchange for Plaintiff's promise that his persona: 
guarantee for the Corporate debt would be entirely cancelled anc 
released. 
The Corporation apparently only made partial payments to tn: 
Plaintiff, STRAVELL PATTERSON, for its outstanding debts and a 
Default Judgment was rendered against the Corporation for the 
unpaid balance. The trial court in that case ordered the 
remaining inventory of the Corporation sold and applied to ~e 
Judgment. Plaintiff then brought this action seeking to enforce 
Defendant's guarantee of the Corporation's debts. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN SPITE OF CERTAIN 
UNRESOLVED DISPUTES REGARDING MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
The purpose of Summary Judgment is to bar from the Courts 
unnecessary litigation. This occurs only when the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and admissions show there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and one Party is entitled to Judgment as a 
matter of law. In re Williams Estate, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah 1960); 
Harvey vs. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1974). However, Summary 
Judgment should not be granted when it appears that there are 
disputed issues of fact, which if resolved in favor of the 
nonmoving Party, would entitle it to prevail. Wingets, Inc. vs. 
Bitters, 500 P~2d 1007 (Utah 1972). 
Defendant-Appellant does not deny that the Promissory Note, 
upon which Plaintiff brought this action, was duly executed by the 
Corporation, but asserts that said Note was given in exchange for 
an agreement by the Plaintiff to release the Defendant from any 
liability as a guarantor. Plaintiff obviously disputes 
-4-
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Defendant's account of the oral release of Defendant from a~ 
potential guarantor liability, but Plaintiff asserts that any su:' 
agreement is void, as within the statute of frauds and for faik 
of consideration in any event. 
The very heart of this matter centers around Defendant's 
guarantee of the Corporate liability and the Defendant's effort 
to prove an oral release made by the Plaintiff upon receipt 
of a Note and Security agreement from the Corporation. In 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Requestfu 
Admissions dated April 7, 1980, the Defendant asserted by meansc' 
a sworn statement the existence of an oral release made by the 
Plaintiff through a "KEITH HYATT". (Answer to Interrogatory 
Number l; Answer to Interrogatory Number 4) In 
Holbrook Company vs. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) this Court 
vacated the Trial Court's Summary Judgment and remanded the ~u 
for further proceedings. The Court said: 
(I)t only takes one sworn statement under oath to 
disputes the averments on the other side of the 
controversy and creates an issue of fact. This is 
analogous to the elemental rule that the fact trier 
may believe one witness as against many, or, many 
against one •.• 
It is not the purpose of the Summary Judgment procedure 
to judge the credibility of the averments of Parti:s, 
or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is. 
it to deny Parties the right to a trial to resolve dis-. 
. 1. . t the time, puted issues of fact. Its purpose is to e imina e 
-5-
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trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken of 
the facts as asserted by the Party ruled against, he 
would not be entitled to prevail. Only when it so appears 
is the Court justified in refusing such a Party the 
opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting 
to persuade the fact trier to his views. Conversly if 
there is any dispute as to any issue, material to the 
settlement of the controversy, the Summary Judgment 
should not be granted. (Emphasis added) 542 P.2d at 193. 
Defendant-Appellant has alleged in a sworn statement the 
existance of an oral release by the Plaintiff herein as to the 
Defendant's liability as a Guarantor for the Corporation's debts. 
This alone suffices to create a dispute as to a material issue of 
fact which precludes the granting of Summary Judgment. Therefore 
the Trial Court's granting of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was error, and should be vacated by this Court. 
In Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. vs. Robinson, 604 P.2d 113 
(Utah 1979) this Court reversed and remanded a Trial Court's 
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict against Defendant's 
Counterclaim. The Court stated: 
(T)he right of trial by jury is one which should be 
carefully safeguarded by the Courts, and when a 
Party has demanded such a Trial, he is entitled to 
have the benefit of the jury's findings on issues of 
fact; and it is not the Trial Court's prerogative to 
disregard or nullify them by making findings of his 
own. Therefore, in ruling on motions which take 
issues of fact from the jury (this includes both 
Motions for directed Verdict and Judgment not With-
standing the Verdict), the Trial Court is o~liged 
to look at the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
-6-
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that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light 
favorable to the Party moved against; and the granting 
of such a Motion is justified only if, in so viewing 
the evidence, there is no substantial basis therein 
which would support verdict in his favor. On appeal, 
in considering the Trial Court's granting of such 
Motions, we will look at the evidence in the same 
manner. 604 P.2d at 917. 
A Motion for Summary Judgment obviously takes the issue of 
fact from the jury. Therefore the Trial Court below should 
have looked at the evidence wilh all reasonable inferences in tr.' 
Defendant's favor. Because the Defendant has submitted a sworn 
statement alleging a dispute upon a material issue of fact in thi 
case, the Court erred in granting the Plaintiff's Summary 
Judgment. For that reason, and the reasons stated below, ~is 
Court should vacate the Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff 
entered in the Trial Court and remand the case for further 
proceedings below. 
POINT II 
THE AGREEMENT TO RELEASE DEFENDANT AS GUARANTOR 
WAS OBTAINED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE CORPORATION'S 
EXECUTION OF A PROMISSORY NOTE TO THE PLAINTIFF, 
AND WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING. 
A. The disputed release is not with~n 
the Statute of Frauds and need not be written. 
-7-
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Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment cited Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 25-5-4, the 
Statute of Frauds, which requires that agreements to answer for 
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another be in writing or be 
void. Plaintiff failed to cite Section 25-5-6, which provides in 
part: 
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in 
any of the following cases is deemed an original ob-
ligation of the Promissor and need not be in writing: 
(3) where the promise, being for an antecedent obli-
gation of another, is made upon consideration that the 
Party receiving it cancel the antecedent obligation, 
accepting the new promise as a substitute therefori 
(Emphasis added) 
The language of this Statute excludes the disputed release of 
Defendant as Guarantor from being within the Stutute of Frauds. 
The Promissory Note was executed by the Defendant as agent of the 
Corporation, and in consideration of the Plaintiff's promise to 
cancel! the Defendant's personal obligation as Guarantor of 
Corporate debts. The Corporation had no obligation to execute a 
Note and Security Agreement, and Defendant personally had no 
obligation to execute the Note and Security Agreement. The 
agreement by the Corporation to execute the Note and Security 
Agreement was obtained in exchange for the Plaintiff's release of 
the Defendant in his personal capacity as Guarantor. Plaintiff's 
-8-
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act in receiving the Promissory Note and Security Agreement 
cancelled the Defendant's personal obligation regarding Corpora•, 
debts. Because the oral promise by the Plaintiff through its 
agent, KEITH HYATT, was not void as being within the Statue of 
Frauds, Defendant should have the opportunity to present 
evidence to establish the nature of the transaction between the 
Parties. 
The only writings which evidence the transaction disput~~ 
the Parties herein are the Note and Security Agreement which the 
Defendant signed as agent for the Corporation. It is well 
established that parol evidence is not admissible to vary the 
terms of a written instrument. But the documents referred to 
above do not deal with the release of Defendant in his Guaru~ 
capacity and no attempt is being made to vary their terms. In 
this regard the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The inquiry is whether the writing was intended to 
cover a certain subject of negotiation; for if it 
was not, then the writing does not embody the trans-
action on that subject ••. whether a particular sub-
ject of negotiation is embodied by the writing 
depends fully on the intent of the Parties thereto ... 
This intent must be sought •.• in the conduct and lan-
guage of the Parties and surrounding circumstances ... 
The question being whether certain suhjects of neg-
otiation were intended to be covered, we must compare 
the writing and the negotiations before we can de-
termine whether they were, in fact, covered •.. in 
deciding upon this intent the chief and most satis-
-9-
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factory index for the Judge is found in the circum-
stances, whether or not the particular element of the 
alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in 
the writing. If it is mentioned, covered, or dealt 
with in the writing, then presumably the writing 
was meant to represent all of the transaction on that 
element; if it is not, then probably the writing was 
not intended to embody that element of the negotiation. 
(Citing Whigmore) Farr vs. Wasatch Chemical Company, 
143 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 1943). 
In the case at bar the only writings which evidence the 
disputed transaction are the Note and Security Agreement. The 
writings do not mention, cover, or deal with the release of 
Defendant as guarantor. This is so because the Note and Security 
Agreement were not intended to contain all aspects of the 
transaction. Plaintiff's oral release may, therefore, be proven 
by the "conduct and language of the Parties and the surrounding 
circumstances", and evidence should be received on that point at 
Trial. 
In Christensen vs. Abbott, 595 P.2d 900,902 (Utah 1979), this 
Court stated: 
(T)he parol evidence rule is not applicable to a 
writing which is not intended by the Parties as 
a final and complete expression of their bargain. 
In that case the Supreme Court upheld the admission by the 
Trial Court of oral evidence concerning the cancellation of a 
Promissory Note, and held that the parol evidence rule was not 
-10-
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violated because the Note and an accompanying Assumption Agree> 
were not intended as a total expression of the parties 
transaction. In the case at bar, Defendant alleges that the 
release agreement was not intended to be covered in the written 
Promissory Note or Security Agreement. And because of the oral· 
nature of the Release Agreement Defendant should have been al~ 
the opportunity to present evidence as to its scope and effect: 
a trier of fact. 
In Oberhansly vs. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977) the U~ 
Supreme Court stated: 
The burden of proving the existence of a contract 
is on the Party seeking the enforcement of it. Of 
course the intentions of the Parties are controlling, 
and normally these intentions would be found in the 
instrument itself. If a writing is not sufficient 
to establish meaning, however, resort may be had to 
extraneous evidence manifesting the intentions of the 
Parties. 572 P.2d at 1386. 
The actions of the Corporation and Defendant as agent of~ 
Corporation in executing a Promissory Note and Security 
Agreement portend something more than a desire to be accommoda•i 
to the Plaintiff herein. There is no reasonable explaination fr 
why the Defendant herein on behalf of the Corporation wouM ~~ 
executed the Promissory Note and Security Agreement unless ~· 
benefit would have been obtained thereby. The benefit which 
-11-
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Defendant alleges is the release by the Plaintiff of the Defendant 
in his individual capacity for all debts of the Corporation, past 
or present. Defendant seeks the opportunity to present evidence 
at Trial which will support this allegation, and is anxious to 
meet his burden of showing the intentions of the Parties by their 
conduct and by attendant circumstances. 
It is well settled that the parol evidence rule does not have 
any application to subsequent agreements. Therefore evidence of 
subsequent modifications of an integration may be shown even if it 
contradicts the original statement. Contracts, Calamari & Perillo 
2nd Ed. West Publishing Co., Section 3-7. Because the oral 
release by Plaintiff of Defendant in his Guarantor capacity was a 
modification of an original contract whereby Defendant did 
guarantee Corporate debts, parol evidence is admissible to 
establish the nature of that modification. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 70A-2-202 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code provides: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda 
of the Party agree, or, which are otherwise set forth 
in a writing intended by the Parties as a final ex-
pression of their agreement with respect to such terms 
as are included therein may not be contradicted by 
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous 
oral agreement, but may be explained by (a) course of 
dealing or usage of trade or by course of performance; 
and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms un-
-12-
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less the Court finds the writing to have been intended 
also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
of the agreement. 
The oral release by Plaintiff of Defendant does not 
contradict the Note and Security Agreement, but it explains wh\ 
these instruments were executed. The Note and Security Agre9~ 
executed by Defendant in his capacity as agent were not intende: 
by the Parties as a final expression of their agreement only as 
the agreed-upon amount of Corporate indebtedness and securi~ 
therefor. The writings were intended to provide a benefit tot'' 
Plaintiff in coming to an agreement with a Corporation as ~ 0 
extent of its obligations, and evidencing the extent of that de" 
in clear and uncertain terms, as well as to secure that debt b:: 
the inventory owned by the Corporation. These writings were no: 
intended to contain the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendac· 
as to the release of Defendant's individual liability as Guaran:: 
of Corporate debts. Therefore the writings were not a total 
integration of _the Party's overall agreement. Comment 3 of the 
above-cited section states that under the Code there is not a 
total integration unless the alleged additional terms "would 
certainly have been included in the document in view of the 
Court". That is, for there to be a total integration which wo''· 
exclude any parol evidence regarding the oral release, the Tr~ 
-13-
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Court would have to find as a matter of law that the Parties 
intended to include all aspects of their transaction in the 
Promissory Note and Security Agreement signed by the Defendant as 
agent of the Corporation. As noted above, Defendant has submitted 
a sworn statement in answering Plaintiff's Interrogatories which 
disputes this allegation. Therefore the existence and terms of 
this oral release are material issues of fact disputed by the 
Parties in the instant case, and the Trial Court improperly 
granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Guarantee Agreement on behalf of the Corporation by 
MICHAEL FRANCIS and LLOYD UNGRICHT contains a clause requiring 
that revocation by said Guarantors of prospective liability could 
be obtained only by written notice after thirty (30) days had 
expired. This requirement in no way renders void the oral release 
by the Plaintiff through its agents. The guarantee clause 
requires that a written notice of termination must be sent in 
order to abrogate the Guarantor's liability for any future debts 
of the Corporation. This Notice was sent by the Defendant and 
received by the Plaintiff, and is not the subject of the dispute 
between the Parties. The oral release which Defendant seeks to 
establish on behalf of the Plaintiff resulted from a subsequent 
transaction and concerns the liability of Defendant as Guarantor 
-14-
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for past Corporate debts, including the Promissory Note. Ther~­
fore an oral agreement is sufficient to release Defendant froot 
liability as Guarantor of Corporate debts. 
B. No consideration is required for an instrument 
given as security for an antecedent obligation. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-3-408 of the Utah Unifum 
Commercial Code provides: 
Want or failure of consideration is a defense against a~ 
person not having the right of a holder in due course, 
except that no consideration is necessary for an instru-
ment or obligation thereon given in payment of or as 
security for an anticedent obligation of any kind ... 
Comment Two to that Section provides: 
The "Except" Clause is intended to remove the difficulties 
which have arisen where a note or a draft, or an endorsemen: 
of either, is given as payment or security for a debt 
already owed by the party giving it, or by a third party ... 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff's oral promise to release 
Defendant from his individual liability as Guarantor of corporat! 
debt was obtained by the Defendant giving the Plaintiff a 
Promissory Note and Security Agreement on behalf of the 
Corporation. Therefore, no separate consideration was necesn0 
for Plaintiff to be bound in releasing Defendant from his 
liability. By the Corporation executing a valid note and securit 
agreement the Plaintiff became bound on it's promise to releaH 
Defendant. 
-15-
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In Castle & Co. vs. Bagley , 467 P.2d 408 (Utah 1970) this 
Court affirmed the decision that the Trial Court rendered in favor 
of the Plaintiff. There the Defendant orally agreed to personally 
pay any prior indebtedness of his company, if the Plaintiff would 
extend him further credit and deliver merchandise to him. 
Defendant there executed a Promissory Note in his individual 
capacity, but later refused to pay said Note. The Trial Court 
concluded that no consideration for the Note executed by the 
Defendant was necessary for the obligation to be binding upon 
Defendant. In the case at Bar, the maker of the Note, the 
corporation, had no obligation to give the Note to the Plaintiff 
herein, but did so upon reaching an agreement as to the amount of 
corporate obligation and the release of the Defendant from his 
guarantee of that corporate debt. Therefore Plaintiff should be 
bound by it's oral promise to release the Defendant from his 
individual liability, and the Trial Court's granting of Summary 
Judgment against Defendant without hearing evidence thereon, was 
improper. 
Under the sales portion of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
Section 70A-2-201 (1) one finds: "An agreement modifying a 
contract within this article needs no consideration to be 
binding." The Section does not require the modifying agreement to 
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be writen except in two instances. First a writing is r1 
the contract, as modified, is withing the Staute of Frau1 
provision of the Code, or, second, if the original contr 
its terms, excludes modification or recission by mutual 
except by a writing. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Utah Un 
Commercial Code, Section 70A-2-209 (2) (3). Since the d 
transaction does not come within the Statute of Frauds, 
writing is not required for a recission or cancellation 
liability for past debts by the terms of the agreement i 
there need not have been consideration given by the Part 
agreement to release Defendant herein from his liability 
Corporate Guarantor. 
In any event pre-UCC case law has held that the giv 
a Note and Mortgage as an additional security for a pre-
debt is done upon valuable consideration. Abraham vs. A 
349 P.2d 385 (Utah 1964) 1 Bowman vs. White, 369 P.2d 962 
1962). The fact that the Corporation gave to the Plaint 
Promissory Note and Security Agreement which it had prev 
never given to Plaintiff, was sufficient consideration t 
the oral agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant bindi 
Plaintiff. This act clearly benefited the Plaintiff in 
now had a sum certain upon which it couln hold the Corpe 
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accountable, which was not clearly fixed or agreed upon prior to 
that time, and it further secured said indebtedness by means of a 
Security Agreement covering the Corporation's inventory. 
C. The agreement whereby Plaintiff received a Note 
and Security Agreement from the Corporation in ex-
change for Plaintiff's release of Defendant in his 
Guarantor capacity constitutes an accord and 
satisfation. 
Plaintiff argued below that the receipt by it of the 
Promissory Note and Security Agreement by the Corporation cannot 
discharge Defendant's guarantee for Corporate debts because the 
Corporation was already obligated and indebted to Plaintiff. 
However the Corporation had no duty to give Plaintiff the 
Promissory Note referred to, nor enter into a Security 
Agreement which covered its inventory. Rather the Corporation, 
through its agent who is the Defendant herein, was induced to do 
so at the request of Plaintiff, and therefore, ~uffered a legel 
detriment in executing the documents. The amounts which the 
Corporation owed the Plaintiff on an open account basis became a 
sum certain and an admitted liability by the Corporation. Because 
the Parties agreed to compromise their claims against each other 
and settled on an amount for which the Corporation would be 
indebted to the Plaintiff, and Plaintiff received a Note and 
Security Agreement as requested, and Plaintiff agreed to release 
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the Defendant as to his individual liability, the guarantee of 
Defendant should be discharged because of an accord and 
satisfaction. Utah's highest Court has stated: 
This doctrine requires that there be a dispute 
or uncertainty as to the amount due and that the 
Parties enter into an agreement that the debtor will 
pay and the creditor will accept, the lesser amount 
as a compromise of their differences and in satis-
faction of the debt ••. it must clearly appear that 
the Parties so understood and entered into a new and 
substitute contract. To itate the matter in trad-
itional contract writting: That there was a definite 
meetings of the minds on such an agreement. 
Tates, Inc. vs. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 
1228, 1229 (Utah 1975). 
This Court has further stated: 
An accord and satisfaction is a method of discharging 
a contract or settling a claim arising from a contract, 
by substituting for such contract or claim an agree-
ment for the satisfation therein, and the execution 
of the substituted agreement. 
To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must 
be an offer in full satisfaction of the obligation, 
accompanied by such acts and declarations as amount 
to a condition that if it is accepted, it is to be 
in full satisfaction, and the condition must be 
such that the Party to whom the of fer is made is 
bound to understand that if he accepts ·it, he does 
so subject to the conditions imposed ••• the accord 
is the agreement and the satisfaction is the ex-
ecution or performance of such an agreement. ~ 
vs. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 
1386 (Utah 1977), citing 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and 
Satisfaction, 1. 
That Court noted that where consideration is necessary for 
the substitute agreement, consideration may rest on the settler; 
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of the dispute. In the instant case the Trial Court, by entering 
Summary Judgment against Defendant below, denied the Defendant the 
opportunity to present evidence that the Parties reached an accord 
as to how to discharge their various disputed debts, and that 
satisfaction thereof was obtained by the Plaintiff which received 
a Note and Security Agreement from the Corporation. However 
Defendant herein was denied his satisfaction in that he was not 
released as Guarantor for Corporate debts as the Plaintiff had 
promised. By denying the Defendant an opportunity to present 
evidence as to the substituted agreement, the Trial Court 
improperly decided a disputed issue of material fact in favor of 
the Plaintiff without hearing evidence thereon. 
In Christensen vs. Abbott, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld a Trial Court decision which allowed the cancellation of a 
Promissory Note after receiving evidence of an oral agreement 
constsituting an accord and satisfaction. The Court noted that 
"There is no requirement that an accord and satisfaction must be 
in writing". 595 P.2d at 902. As to the argument that allowing 
evidence of an oral agreement to cancel the Promissory Note would 
violate the parol evidence rule, the Court stated: 
{T)he parol evidence rule is not applicab~e to a 
writing which is not intende~ by the P~rties a~ 
a final and complete expression of their bargain. 
Here the District Court's conclusions necessarily 
contemplate a finding that the written agreement 
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was not intended as the total expression of the 
agreement •.. We believe that such a finding is 
correct and hold that the Court properly received 
the evidence of the alleged oral agreement con-
cerning the cancellation of the Note. 595 P.2d at 
902,903. 
The fact that the accord and satisfaction alleged by 
Defendant herein is not in writing does not prevent the Trial 
Court from allowing evidence in establishing the same. And 
since Defendant has submitted a sworn statement alleging the 
I 
existence of such an agreement, a disputed issue of material lac:' 
exists precluding a granting of Summary Judgment on behalf of 
either Party. Defendant alleges in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of hi' 
Answer the factual basis for his affirmative defenses, includin~ 
accord and satisfation. Although the words of accord and 
satisfaction are not specifically used, the transactions therein 
described clearly constitute a basis for that defense and should 
be sufficient. Counsel for Defendant argued the same point oral: 
before the Trial Court below. Whether or not there was an accori 
and satisfaction is a question of fact upon which the Court hua 
duty to hear evidence. Therefore the Trial Court's granting of 
the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was improper and 
should be vacated. 
The Defendant does not assert that the giving of the Note a~ 
Security Agreement by the Corporation to the Plaintiff herein 
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extinguished the Defendant's liability automatically, by 
operation of law. Rather Defendant asserts that it was an 
express agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant on behalf of 
the Corporation that Defendant's personal liability would be 
cancelled. It is not the giving of the Note which released the 
Defendant of his liability as Guarantor, but the agreement by the 
Plaintiff to accept the Note and Security Agreement in exchange 
for the release which cancelled the Defendant's liability. In 
Ford Motor Credit Company vs. Bob Jones Interprises, Inc., 240 
F.Supp. 667 (Colo. Dist. 1965) the Court considered the question 
of release by operation of law. After noting that the giving of a 
Note does not by itself satisfy an obligation and release the 
Guarantor, the Court stated: 
It is, of course, possible to contract to release 
a guarantee such as this by the giving of the Note 
but the intention to do so must be apparant ..• 
(T)o bring about a discharge, it would have to appear 
that an accord and satisfaction had been intended 
by the delivery of this subsequent Note. 
In that case the Court looked to the intention of the Parties 
as manifested in the surrounding circumstances and basic facts 
which might give rise to any inference of their intent. But the 
Trial Court in the case at bar failed to allow this. Defendant 
was therefore improperly prevented from presenting evidence 
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regarding the Parties intentions about the disputed transaction. 
This again is a material issue of fact as to whether the No~ 
given by the Corporation in connection wit11 the Security Agre~ro· 
was a renewal of a prior Corporate obligation, as the Plaintiff 
contends, of whether there was, in fact, a new agreement in lk 
of the earlier one, as contended by the Defendant. The Trial 
Court's Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff improperly decW 
a material issue of fact disputed by the Parties without receiv:· 1 
evidence thereon, which Judgment should be vacated. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ALLEGE OR PROVE COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE TERMS OF ITS PRIOR JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
CORPORATION, THUS PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF 1S PRESENT 
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
The default Judgment rendered for Plaintiff herein against 
the Corporation, exhibit "D" in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, contains an Order that: 
The inventory of stock in trade of Defendant, MOUNTAIN-
LAND SPORTS, INC., including all materials to be used 
or consumed in the business of said Defendant, and all 
products of said Defendant, possessed or maintained by 
the Defendant in connection with its business, and all 
Defendant's personal property, furniture, furnishings, 
equipment and fixtures be sold in a commercially reason-
able manner in accordance with the Utah Uniform Com-
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mercial Code and the proceeds therefrom shall be applied 
to the amount owing from the Defendant to Plaintiff as 
provided herein. (Empasis added) 
Nowhere has the Plaintiff made any allegations that the 
provisons of this Order and the Judgment have been followed or 
complied with, other than the sweeping assertion that: "the 
Judgment has not been satisfied". (Plaintiff's Complaint, 
paragraph 4) Nowhere does the Plaintiff allege that any efforts 
have been made towards a private or public sale of the property 
covered by the Security Agreement as ordered by the prior Court. 
No claim has been made that an effort to levy on the property of 
the Defendant in the prior action was made and was unsuccessful. 
No statement or allegation by the Plaintiff has been made which 
might account for any proceeds from such sale, if one was held. 
Failure by the Plaintiff to establish its compliance with the 
terms of the Judgment rendered by the prior Court against the 
Corporation is fatal to whatever cause of action might now seek to 
establish. That Court's affirmative Order that the goods and 
inventory of the Corporation be sold in a commercially reasonable 
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the Utah UCC 
requires certain acts by the Plaintiff in order for it to proceed 
upon that debt. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section ?OA-9-504 states: 
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Disposition of the collatoral may be by public or 
private proceedings and may be made by one or more 
contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a 
unit or in parcels and at any time and place upon 
any terms, but every aspect of the disposition, in-
cluding the method, manner, time, and place, must be 
commercially reasonable ••• reasonable notification 
of the time and place of any private sale or any 
other intended disposition is to be made shall be 
sent by the secured Party to the debtor. 
This Court has held that the creditor's failure to compfy 
with the requirements governing disposition of repossessed 
collateral serves as an absolute bar to the creditor's right to:' 
deficiency judgment. FMA Financial Corp. vs Pro-Printers, 590 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). (Hereinafter Pro-Printers) In the insta1· 
case Plaintiff seeks to establish that Defendant now stands int'·' 
shoes of the debtor-corporation, and he should be individual~ 
liable therefore. By that logic the Defendant herein would need: 
receive all notices of the sale and disposition of the 
Corporation's goods and assets which the UCC requires be given tc 
the debtor. If Plaintiff has, indeed, executed on the goods H 
ordered by the prior Court, then Plaintiff had the responsibilitV 
of giving Defendant herein reasonable notice of the sale and 
conducting the sale in a commercially reasonable manner. In~ 
Printers, supra, this Court stated: 
(T)he secured Party has the burden of establishing that 
the disposition of the property was done in a com- . 
mercially reasonable manner and that reasonable notice 
to the debtor (s) was given. We have held that a guarantor, 
-25-
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We have have held that a Guarantor, •.. is a debtor 
under the Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore 
entitled to notice under 70A-9-Sd4(3). (Emphasis added) 
590 P.2d at 806, 807. 
In the instant case Plaintiff has obviously not met the 
burden of establishing reasonable notice in a commercially 
reasonable manner, because Plaintiff has never alleged, and 
Defendant has in fact never received notice whatsoever in this 
regard. Plaintiff's failure to-give Defendant the statutorily 
required notice is fatal to its cause of action, and certainly 
precludes summary judgment in its favor in this action. 
Plaintiff has also failed to allege whether or not a 
sale--reasonable or not--occurred or efforts to that end were ever 
made, as ordered by the Trial Court. These are essential 
requirements which must be alleged and proven before Plaintiff can 
prevail upon his alleged cause of action. In 
Chrysler Credit Corp. vs. Burns, 562 P.2d 233 (Utah 1977) this 
Court held that where no notice of time, date, place and manner of 
sale was given to a debtor by a secured ParEy-Seller, the sale was 
not commercially reasonable and, not only was the Creditor not 
entitled to a dificiency judgment or attorney's fees, but the 
debtor was entitled to damages for the secured Party's failure to 
comply with the statute governing repossession and sale under 
Section 70A-9-507. Plaintiff has no where alleged compliance with 
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these provisions, and these defects are fatal to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and his cause of action as well. 
Therefore the Trial Court improperly granted the Plaintiff Sum~a:: 
Judgment without requiring the Plaintiff to allege, much less 
prove, compliance with the UCC requirements for disposing of the 
Coporation's secured collateral. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the many disputed issues of material fact which 
exist in this case, the Trial Court's granting of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was improper as a matter of law. Th:' 
case cannot be decided without receiving evidence on the ma~ 
disputed issues of material fact alleged by both Parties. 
Defendant has alleged a sufficient factual basis which would, if 
resolved in his favor, defeat Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's 
cause of action contains defects which, if resolved in Defendant'' 
favor, would prevent the Trial Court from ruling for the 
Plaintiff. The Trial Court's granting of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was error and should be reversed by this Court. 
Defendant therefore respectfully requests this Court to vacate~'~ 
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Trial Court's Order of Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 
to remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this _i_f}iaay of June, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT 
ESPLIN & ANDERSON 
By 
CERTIF'ICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed t~o copies of the foregoing 
i:3rief of Appellant t_c-, DANNY C. KELLY & DAVID J. JORDAN, of VAN 
COT1', BAGLEY, CORNWAL & MC CARTHY, Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Rc>s~j·.ncient at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
--/. day of June, 1981. 
--28-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Trial Court's Order of Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 
to remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1f~ day of June, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, DAVID WILKINSON, 
at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this _!if/J_ day 
of June, 1981. 
~_z~d_i~h~ ---
Secretary '~7 
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